This paper o ers a new approach to the study of economic problems usually modeled as games of incomplete information with discontinuous payo s. Typically, the discontinuities arise from indeterminacies (ties) in the underlying problem. The point of view taken here is that the tie-breaking rules which resolve these indeterminacies should be viewed as part of the solution rather than part of the description of the model. A solution is therefore a tie-breaking rule together with strategies satisfying the usual best-response criterion. When information is incomplete, solutions need not exist; that is, there may be no tie-breaking rule that is compatible with the existence of strategy pro les satisfying the usual best-response criteria. It is shown that that the introduction of incentive compatible communication (cheap talk) restores existence.
Introduction
Economics is replete with situations in which privately informed agents behave strategically; such situations are usually modeled as games of incomplete information. As Harsanyi showed, the equilibrium analysis of such games is no more complicated than the equilibrium analysis of games of complete information | provided the set of possible types of agents and the set of actions available to agents are nite. However, in many familiar situations | including Bertrand price competition, Cournot quantity competition, Hotelling spatial competition, games of timing, and auctions | actions are naturally modeled as continuous variables. Strategic analysis of such situations is di cult because tie-breaking rules | prescribing behavior of the auctioneer when agents submit the same bid for instance | lead to payo functions that are discontinuous in actions. Much of the existing analysis of such situations avoids the consequences of discontinuity by imposing conditions (such as private values, symmetric information, non-atomicity of prior distributions, etc.) that guarantee ties do not occur at equilibrium and hence that discontinuities do not matter. 1 As soon as we leave the simplest environments, however, we nd situations in which ties do occur and discontinuities do matter | indeed, we nd situations in which equilibrium does not exist.
For contexts in which information is complete, Simon and Zame (1990) (henceforth SZ) argued that such situations should be modeled, not as games in which payo s are discontinuous, but rather as games in which payo s are only partially determined, and that the tie-breaking rule which leads to discontinuities in payo s should be viewed as part of the solution, rather than as part of the data. SZ show that (with natural conditions), such a solution (a tie-breaking rule together with a strategy pro le satisfying the usual bestresponse criteria) always exists. In this paper, we extend this point of view and result to situations in which information is incomplete.
It might seem at rst glance that this extension would be routine, following Harsanyi's method of analyzing a game ? of incomplete information by transforming it into a game ? of complete information | but it is not. One di culty is that it not clear how indeterminacies in the game ? should be transformed into indeterminacies in the game ? ; another is that it is not clear what assumptions on ? will guarantee that ? has a solution. Most importantly, it is not clear how a solution for ? (if it exists) should be interpreted as a solution to ?.
That these di culties re ect real problems with existence of a solution, and not merely with a particular approach, can be seen in a simple example. Consider a sealed-bid auction with two bidders, whose private valuations v 1 ; v 2 for a single indivisible object are drawn from a joint distribution as follows:
with probability 1/2, v 1 = 1 and v 2 is drawn from the uniform distribution on 1; 2] with probability 1/2, v 2 = 1 and v 1 is drawn from the uniform distribution on 1; 2]
It is easy to see that the only tie-breaking rules that admit any equilibrium at all have the property that when both bidders bid 1, the object is awarded to the bidder whose valuation is higher. Given any such a tie-breaking rule, it is an equilibrium for both bidders always to bid 1. Of course, such a tiebreaking rule cannot be implemented by an auctioneer who does not observe the valuations of the bidders, and allowing such observation would hardly seem consistent with the presumption that this information is private.
Suppose, however, we allow the bidders to announce their types (their true valuations) as well as their bids. If the auctioneer is constrained to sell the object at the highest bid and breaks ties by awarding the object to the bidder who announces the higher valuation, then it is an equilibrium for both bidders to bid 1 and to truthfully announce their types. 2 The key insight of this paper is that, in considerable generality, this communication is necessary and su cient for the existence of a solution.
It is instructive to think about this auction above in an environment in which bids must be in multiples of a smallest monetary unit ; for simplicity assume that 1= is an integer. Independently of the tie-breaking rule, it is an equilibrium for both players to follow the bidding strategy b(v) =
( 1 ? if v = 1 1 if v > 1 (Because 1= is an integer, 1 is a multiple of , hence an admissible bid.) For every > 0 the bids convey the information as to which bidder has the higher valuation, but in the limit when = 0 this information is lost; allowing bidders to announce their valuations restores this lost information. (This echoes a theme of Christopher Harris.) As in this simple example, our approach is to extend the model so that individuals may announce their private information. Such announcements need not be truthful and do not directly a ect payo s; their only role is to aid in breaking ties. In at least one interpretation (discussed further below), these announcements can be viewed as \cheap talk." Our main result (Theorem 1) is that (with natural conditions) this extension always has at least one solution (a tie-breaking rule together with a strategy pro le satisfying the usual best-response criterion) in which individuals truthfully announce their private information. Type announcements are thus incentive compatible. We emphasize that the tie-breaking rule will be determined as part of the solution, and not prescribed exogenously, that the tie-breaking rule may prescribe di erent divisions at di erent ties, and that the tie-breaking rule may depend on announcements as well as on actions. As the previous example and others in the text demonstrate, if we are not satis ed with such a tie-breaking rule then we will be faced with many situations in which no solution exists.
Although the proof of our main result is parallel to the proof of the main result of SZ, it is by no means a routine extension. (Our analysis would be much simpler if we restricted attention to nite type spaces, but it would seem contrived to insist on continuous action spaces and discrete type spaces.) The text discusses the di erences between the present argument and that in SZ in some detail.
As in SZ, we might interpret an endogenous tie-breaking rule as a proxy for \actions taken by unseen agents whose behavior is not modelled explicitly." For example, although we would commonly model a sealed-bid auction among N bidders as a simultaneous-move game with N players, it might also (and perhaps more properly) be modelled as two-stage game with N +1 players. In the rst stage of this latter game, the N bidders submit simultaneous bids; in the second stage the auctioneer chooses the winner. If the auctioneer is constrained (by law, for instance) to choose among the high bidders then the auctioneer's strategy in the two-stage game corresponds precisely to an endogenous tie-breaking rule in the simultaneous-move game, and the subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage game correspond precisely to solutions of the simultaneous-move game. 3 In general, the two-stage game will not admit any (subgame perfect) equilibrium unless we allow the bidders to communicate their private information. These communications do not a ect payo s | utilities depend only on private information, on bids, and on the the auctioneer's actions | but the auctioneer conditions his actions on these communications. Hence communications in the two-stage game | which correspond precisely to announcements in the simultaneous-move game | are \cheap talk" in a familiar sense. Manelli (1996) provides a very similar use of cheap talk to guarantee the existence of equilibrium in signalling games. Alternatively, an endogenous tie-breaking rule might be interpreted as a proxy for the outcome of an unmodeled second stage game. Thus, in their analysis of rst-price sealed-bid auctions for a single indivisible items, Maskin and Riley (2000) adjoin to the sealed-bid stage a second stage in which the bidders who submitted the high bids in the rst stage participate in a Vickrey auction. In the private value setting, it is a dominant strategy for bidders in this second stage Vickrey auction to bid their true values. Thus the second stage auction induces a tie-breaking rule that awards the item to the bidder who values it the most.
We should emphasize that our results concern only the existence of solutions in mixed strategies; we have little to say about the existence of solutions in pure strategies. For recent work on pure strategy equilibrium in auctions and similar environments, see Maskin and Riley (2000) , Reny (1999) and Athey (forthcoming) .
Of course, the di culties that arise because of discontinuities are a consequence of our insistence on a model in which action spaces are continuous. Restricting attention to discrete action spaces, either as an assumption about the situations to be modeled or as a modeling strategy for approximating continuous action spaces by discrete action spaces, will yield a game to which familiar xed point theorems may be applied. However, there are a number of reasons why models with continuous action spaces may be more satisfactory than models with discrete action spaces.
(i) The equilibria of the game with discrete action spaces may depend very sensitively on the particular discretization chosen | but it may not be obvious that any particular discretization is \correct." When van Gogh's \Irises" was sold at auction, bids were required to be in multiples of $100,000, but other auctions frequently allow bids in multiples of $10 or $1. Indeed, when bids are prices per unit, they may well be in multiples of $.01 or less. When the strategic variable is time, the issue is more subtle. Discretization amounts to an assumption that players can move only at some pre-speci ed speed, but there may be no reason to suppose that all players can move at the same speed | especially if a great deal can be gained by moving just a little more quickly. Of course, continuous action spaces are an idealization, and would not be of much interest if equilibria in models with continuous action spaces did not correspond to limits of equilibria in models with discrete action spaces. Our convergence result (Theorem 2) shows that this is the case: if we restore information lost in the limit, then equilibria of the discrete action games converge to equilibria of the continuous action games. (ii) The decision to model choice variables as continuous can greatly simplify the analysis of equilibrium. In private value auctions, for example, it is frequently the case that modeling bids bids as discrete variables leads to a multiplicity of equilibria, while modeling bids as continuous variables allows the conclusion that equilibrium is (essentially) unique. 4 Moreover, as in Maskin and Riley (2000) , modeling bids as continuous variables allows equilibrium to be characterized as the solutions to differential equations. (iii) Game theory usually simpli es the study of strategic interactions by assuming that choice variables are discrete; general equilibrium theory usually simpli es the study of markets by assuming that commodities are divisible. If we want to think about strategic interactions in markets, it seems necessary to accommodate continuous choice variables in game theory, just as indivisible goods have been accommodated in general equilibrium theory.
Applications are largely beyond the scope of the present paper, but we do give one simple application to private value auctions to show how a solution with communication may sometimes be used as a starting point from which to derive a solution without communication. Jackson and Swinkels (1999) and Simon and Zame (1999) provide more extensive elaborations on the same theme, extending some results of LeBrun (1995 LeBrun ( , 1999 and Maskin and Riley (2000) .
Following this Introduction, Section 2 presents several examples which illustrate some of the di culties we face and and the way in which communication resolves them. Section 3 presents the general model. Section 4 discusses the extension to allow communication, and discusses our general existence result and a convergence theorem that follows as a straightforward consequence. Section 5 presents the application to private value auctions. Proofs are collected in Section 6.
converges to a communication equilibrium of the auction game with continuous bids. As in Example 3, we can show that such communication equilibria are behaviorally equivalent to equilibria without communication. It follows that the equilibria of the auction games with discrete bids converge to the unique equilibrium of the auction game with continuous bids. Thus, the multiplicity of equilibria disappears in the limit.
Examples
In the Introduction, we have described a rst price auction with private values which has the property that no tie-breaking rule that is independent of private information is compatible with any equilibrium. The analysis and conclusion depends crucially on the fact that marginal distributions have atoms (see Section 5). Lest the reader suspect that atoms play a crucial role in general, we give here a simple example to show that type-dependent tie-breaking rules may be required as soon as valuations have a common component. 5 Example 1 Consider a sealed-bid rst price auction for a single indivisible object. There are two bidders; each bidder i observes a private signal t i (which we identify as i's type). Types are independently and uniformly distributed on 0; 1]. Given types t 1 ; t 2 , valuations are v 1 (t 1 ; t 2 ) = 5 + t 1 ? 4t 2 v 2 (t 1 ; t 2 ) = 5 ? 4t 1 + t 2
After observing private signals, bidders simultaneously submit bids; the high bidder wins and pays his bid. Ties are resolved according to some speci ed tie-breaking rule.
We claim that no type-independent tie-breaking rule is compatible with the existence of equilibrium. The intuition is not hard to convey. How should bidder 1's bidding behavior change as his signal increases? For each particular type of bidder 2, a higher signal for bidder 1 means a higher value. Given that signals are independently distributed and that ties are broken in a way that is independent of signals, bidder 1 should tend to bid more when his signal is high. On the other hand, given that ties are broken in a way that is independent of signals, when bidder 1 bids more he will win more often when bidder 2 is a high type. Since a high type of bidder 2 is bad news for bidder 1, it follows that bidder 1 should tend to bid less when his signal is high. It turns out that these two tendencies put an upper bound on the highest bid and a lower bound on the lowest bid that are incompatible, so we conclude that there is no equilibrium at all if the tie-breaking rule is type-independent. Supporting this intuition with rigorous argument is not di cult, but it is messy, so we defer it to Section 6. 6 Suppose, however, that we allow the bidders to announce their types as well as their bids and allow the auctioneer to use these announcements when breaking ties. Suppose, for instance, that the auctioneer breaks ties so that a bidder who announces a type above .5 always wins against a bidder who announces a type below .5, but randomizes with equal probabilities following all other pairs of announcements. 7 Given this tie-breaking rule, it is an equilibrium for both bidders to bid 3.5, independent of their type, and to announce their type truthfully. (Verifying that this is an equilibrium is straightforward but illuminating. The crucial observation is that, given the tie breaking rule, if bidder i were to bid slightly above 3.5, that would change the outcome only in that i would win more often when j's type is high; but in that circumstance, i would prefer to lose. Similarly, if bidder i were to bid slightly below 3.5, that would change the outcome only in that i would lose more often when j's type is low; but in that circumstance, i would prefer to win.) } The example above illustrates that without type-dependent tie-breaking rules, equilibria need not exist. Even when equilibria, do exist, however, there may still be di culties, because the only equilibria may be degenerate; we want equilibria that satisfy some re nement such as perfection in the sense of Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) . The following example illustrates these points.
Example 2 Consider a sealed-bid second price auction for a single indivisible object. There are two bidders. Bidder i's valuation is at i + (1 ? a)q, where x i is a personal component and q is a common component. The private components x i are distributed independently and take on values 0; 1 with equal probability. The common component q is distributed independently of 6 Our analysis is aided by the fact that each bidder's valuation is decreasing in the other bidder's type, but our experience with discrete examples suggests to us that similar examples could be constructed in which valuations are increasing in both types.
7 Neither the cut point :5 nor the common bid 3:5 is uniquely determined. When a = 0 the setting is one of pure common values, and with a = 1 of pure private values; assume 0 < a < 1 so that valuations have both common and private components. This auction always admits trivial asymmetric equilibria: one bidder always bids 1 + v while the other bidder always bids 0. But if the tie-breaking rule is type-independent, then it admits no symmetric equilibrium, and no equilibrium that is perfect in the sense of Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) Note that outcomes depend on actions but not on types. On the other hand, utilities depend on actions, on outcomes and on types. The interpretation intended is that for an action pro le a 2 A, the set (a) represents the set of outcomes that might result if the action pro le a is taken. In the usual rst price auction for a single indivisible object, the structure is particularly simple: (a) is a singleton unless a involves ties, in which case (a) represents the probability with which each of the high bidders receives the object. (Assuming that (a) assigns positive probability only to the high bidders represents a natural constraint on the auctioneer. Of course one might certainly imagine situations in which the auctioneer was subject to fewer constraints, leading to a di erent speci cation of .) In an auction for k (not necessarily identical) divisible objects, actions might be demand schedules, and (a) might represent physical or probabilistic divisions of each of the various objects and charges to the various bidders.
As usual, we write t ?i for a pro le of types of all players other than i, and T ?i for the space of such type pro les. We adopt similar notation for action pro les, strategy pro les, marginals, etc.
We assume throughout that action spaces A i and type spaces T i are compact metric is a Borel measure is absolutely continuous with respect to the product i of its marginals 8 is a compact convex 9 metrizable subset of a locally convex topological vector space E the outcome correspondence is upper-hemi-continuous, with nonempty compact values the utility mapping is continuous 10
The game ? is a ne if the correspondence has convex values and, for each action pro le a 2 A and type pro le t 2 T the function u(a; ; t) : (a) ! IR N is a ne. The meaning of a neness can be seen easily in a simple perfect information, rst-price auction for a cake of size 1. Suppose each bidder i is a von Neumann { Morgenstern expected utility maximizer, whose utility for cake and money is U i (c; m) = u i (c) + m; without loss normalize so that u i (0) = 0; u i (1) = 1. If outcomes are physical divisions of cake and payment, then bidder i's utility when both bidders bid b and i gets the physical share is u i ( ) ? b. Hence the game is a ne exactly when the functions u i are a ne; with our normalization this means that u i (c) = c. On the other hand, if outcomes are probabilistic divisions of cake and payment, then (because i is an expected utility maximizer) bidder i's utility when i bids b and gets the probabilistic share is u i (1) + b]. Hence the game is always a ne. In particular, when outcomes are probabilistic divisions, a neness is compatible with risk aversion or with any other attitude toward risk.
If type spaces are singletons an a ne game with indeterminate outcomes is equivalent to what SZ calls a game with an endogenous sharing rule.
Following Milgrom and Weber (1985) , a distributional strategy for player i is a probability measure i on T i A i whose marginal on T i is i . If = ( 1 ; : : :; n ) is a pro le of distributional strategies, we write for the joint distribution on T A. If f is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of with respect to the product i i of its marginals, then = f i i .
If : A ! is a selection from (that is, (a) 2 (a) for each a 2 A) that is universally measurable 11 , and = ( 1 ; : : :; n ) is a pro le of distributional strategies, we de ne expected utilities We emphasize that we allow the tie-breaking rule to depend on actions but not on types | which will typically be unobservable. Alternatively, given a universally measurable selection from , we dene a Bayesian game ? by specifying players, action spaces, type spaces and priors as for ?, and de ning utilities by u (a; t) = u(a; (a); t). A solution for ? may therefore be identi ed as a universally measurable selection from and a pro le of distributional strategies = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) which constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for ? . If is a continuous selection then ? has continuous payo s and the existence of equilibrium follows from familiar results. However, the correspondence may not admit any continuous selections, so that the game ? will typically have discontinuous payo s. 11 Recall that a set G is universally measurable if it is measurable with respect to the completion of every Borel measure; i.e., for every Borel measure there are Borel sets G 0 ; G 00 such that (G n G 0 ) (G 0 n G) G 00 and (G 00 ) = 0. Universal measurability of the selection is the weakest measurability requirement consistent with the desideratum that expected utility be well-de ned for all strategy pro les. As the reader will see, the selections constructed in Theorems 1 and 2 of this paper will in fact be Borel measurable.
Communication
As our examples show, a game with indeterminate outcomes may not admit any solutions. In this Section we show how to expand the game to allow players to communicate their private information. In the presence of natural assumptions, this communiction guarantees the existence of equilibrium.
Let ? be a game with indeterminate outcomes. For mnemonic purposes, set S i = T i for each i; we will view elements of S i as announcements and elements of T i as true types. That is, ? c di ers from ? only in that we allow players to announce their types | and hence allow the auctioneer to condition on these announcements | but the announcements are not payo relevant.
Theorem 1 If ? is an a ne game with indeterminate outcomes then the extension ? c admits a solution in which the tie-breaking rule is Borel measurable and type announcements are truthful. 12 If information is complete, the extension ? c coincides with ?. As we have noted earlier, when information is complete, a game with indeterminate outcomes is equivalent to a game with an endogenous sharing rule in the sense of SZ. In this case, therefore, Theorem 1 reduces to the main result of SZ.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in six steps, paralleling the proof of the main result of SZ, but with substantial di erences, indicated below.
Step 1: Finite Approximations Given a game ? and the communication extension ? c , we construct families f? r g, f? cr g of games with nite action spaces (but the same type spaces as ?) which \approximate" ?, ? c . For each of these games we choose an arbitrary selection q r from the outcome correspondence, and use these selections to de ne a Bayesian game. Each of these Bayesian games admits a Bayesian Nash equilibrium r in distributional strategies, having the property that type announcements are truthful. Each q r , which is a function on A, has trivial extensions r : S A ! ,~ r : S A T ! which are independent of announcements and types. The construction here is more elaborate than in SZ | because we must take account of outcomes and types | but very similar.]
Step 2: Limits The strategy pro les r correspond to joint distributions r , and induce outcome-valued vector measures~ r r . Passing to a subsequence as necessary, we show that ( r ) converges to a strategy pro le for the game ? c , and (~ r r ) converges to an outcome-valued vector measure of the form =~ where is a selection from the outcome correspondence c and~ is the trivial extension to S A T that does not depend on types.
Step 3: Convergence of Utilities Convergence of strategy pro les and selections implies convergence of utilities. This step, which is required because we work in outcome space, has no analog in SZ, which works entirely in utility space.]
Step 4: Identifying Better Responses The desired solution strategy pro le is ; the tie-breaking rule will be a perturbation of . Perturbation may be necessary because~ (hence ) is only determined up to sets of -measure 0, leaving open the possibility that there are pro table deviations. For each player i we identify a set H i A i where perturbations may be necessary to prevent deviations by that player, and use the absence of profitable deviations in the games ? r to show that H i has measure 0. The argument here is di erent than in SZ because the dependence of utilities on types requires that we be substantially more careful in the construction of the corresponding deviations in the nite games.]
Step 5: Perturbation We construct the necessary perturbations on the measure 0 sets H i . The argument here is much di erent than in SZ and more subtle in several ways. The perturbations are constructed to punish the potential deviator. In SZ all that is necessary is to choose the worst possible outcome for the deviator. Here, however, utilities depend on types, so there need be no outcome that is \worst possible" for all types of the potential deviator | indeed, there need be no outcome that is uniformly bad for all types of the potential deviator. We therefore use punishment outcomes constructed as limits of outcomes in the nite games. The argument is subtle because these limits must be taken in the weak sense of convergence of vector valued measures, and because these various punishments must be assembled in a measurable way. The construction relies on an in nite dimensional extension of a measurable selection theorem of Dellacherie and Meyer (1982) .]
Step 6: Equilibrium We verify that the perturbed selection 0 and strategy pro le constitute a solution for ? c .
The same argument that proves Theorem 1 establishes a convergence result for equilibria of sequences of games. In order to give a precise statement, we rst need to describe the relevant notion of convergence of games. Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) . This is useful because, as we have noted earlier, perfection rules out trivial equilibria.
We have focused on solutions in which type announcements are truthful, but this probably involves little loss. Indeed, if ? is a game with indeterminate outcomes, ? c is the communication extension, and ; is a solution of ? c for which type announcements are not truthful, we can use a familiar revelation argument to construct a solution 0 ; 0 of ? c which prescribes the same actions, and truthful type announcements, and which induces the same outcome distribution. 13 
Private Value Auctions
Our existence result (Theorem 1) guarantees that the communication extension of a game admits solutions in which players communicate their private information. However, in many circumstances it is possible to a solution with communication into a solution without communication, and hence obtain a solution to the game without communication. The following simple example will illustrate the point. For more on private value auctions, see LeBrun (1995 LeBrun ( , 1999 , Maskin and Riley (2000) , Athey (forthcoming), Jackson and Swinkels (1999), Simon and Zame (1999) and Bresky (2000) .
Example 3 Consider a sealed bid rst price auction for a single indivisible item. Risk neutral bidders i = 1; : : :; n draw a private value t i according to a joint distribution on T = T 1 : : : T n = 0; 1] n ; i's utility if he wins the item and pays b is i ? b. Write i for the marginal of on T i . We assume that each of the marginals i is non-atomic, and that is absolutely continuous with respect to the product 1 : : : n of the marginals. Note that we allow values to be correlated | but not perfectly.
If bids are constrained to be multiples of a smallest monetary unit, the game corresponding to this auction admits a perfect equilibrium, and such an equilibrium has the property that bidders never submit bids above their true values. Theorem 2 therefore guarantees that when arbitrary bids are allowed the communication extension of the game has a solution ; 1 ; : : : ; n with the property that bidders never submits bids above their true values. We assert that in any such solution, the probability a tie for the high bid occurs is 0. Because the details are a little fussy, we merely indicate the argument here, referring to Jackson and Swinkels (1999) or Simon and Zame (1999) for details.
(i) Whenever a tie for the highest bid occurs, there is at most one bidder whose value exceeds the bid, and this bidder must win the item with probability 1. (Otherwise, some bidder who does not win such ties with probability 1 would gain by bidding a little bit more.) (ii) Ties for the highest bid occur with probability 0. (To see this, x a bidder i and a type t i of bidder i, and condition on bidder i being type t i , bidding below his true value, being the highest bidder, and winning a tie. In view of (i), this can only happen if the other bidders who are tied with i are bidding their true value and i is bidding precisely this value. Absolute continuity of information and non-atomicity of marginal distributions implies that this is a set of probability 0. Integrating and applying Fubini's theorem guarantees that ties for the highest bid occur with probability 0.)
Since ties for the high bid occur with probability 0, the tie-breaking rule is irrelevant; in particular, if ' is the tie-breaking rule that randomizes equally among all high bidders then '; is also a solution for the game with communication, whence '; is a solution for the game without communication.
(To see this, suppose that '; were not a solution, so that some bidder, say bidder 1, would prefer to follow a strategy 0 1 6 = 1 . If ties occur with positive probability when bidders follow 0 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n then we could construct another strategy 00 1 for bidder 1, in which 1 bids slightly more than in 0 1 , which 1 still prefers to 1 , and which has the property that ties occur with 0 probability when bidders follow 00 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n . But if ties occur with 0 probability when bidders follow 00 1 ; 2 ; : : :; n then payo s will be the same as when bidders follow . That is, 00 1 is not preferred by bidder 1, hence 0 1 is not preferred by bidder 1.) 14 } An additional point is worth noting. Assume in addition that valuations are independently distributed, and write b i (t i ) for i's (perhaps mixed) equilibrium bidding strategy conditional on observing the valuation t i . It is easily seen that b i is strictly monotone, in the sense that if t i > t 0 i then the every bid in the support of b i (t i ) exceeds every bid in the support of b i (t 0 i ). It follows that b i (t i ) is a pure strategy for almost all valuations t i . Since ties occur with probability 0, we can change the bidding strategies on a set of measure 0 and obtain a pure strategy equilibrium.
Proofs

Example 1
As promised, we provide the details that no type-independent tie-breaking rule is compatible with the existence of any equilibrium. To see this, x a type-independent tie-breaking rule, and assume that b 1 ; b 2 constitute an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies. Because signals are independent and valuations are strictly increasing in own signal, the proof of Proposition 1 in Maskin and Riley (2000) is easily adapted to show that there is no loss in assuming the bidding strategies b 1 ; b 2 are monotone, in the sense that if t 0 i > t i then every bid in the support of b i (t 0 i ) is at least as large as every bid in the support of b i (t i ). It follows immediately that there is an at most countable set of signals t i for which the support of b i (t i ) is not a singleton. For such t i , replace b i by the in mum of the support of b i (t i ). It is easily checked that the modi ed bid functions b 1 ; b 2 again constitute an equilibrium. Thus we have an equilibrium in monotone, pure behavioral strategies. Altering bids following signals 0; 1 if necessary, there is no loss in assuming that b 1 ; b 2 are continuous at 0; 1.
Let b = maxfb 1 (0); b 2 (0)g; and for each i; let i = suppftjb i (t) bg: Assume that 2 = 0: Then, b 1 (0) wins with probability 0, and so earns 0. But, a bid of b + " by 1 wins with positive probability, and for " small, does so only when t 2 = 0 (using that 2 = 0) so that v 1 = 5 + 0 ? 4(0) = 5:
For there not to be a pro table deviation of this form, it must thus be that b 5; and hence that the winning bid is always at least 5: But, the average value of the object, even if allocated optimally to the player with larger t; is 5 + 2=3 ? 4(1=3) < 5, since 2/3 and 1/3 are the expected higher and lower values of two draws from the uniform distribution. So, someone is losing money on average, and would be better o to bid 0 always. This is a contradiction, and so 2 > 0: Arguing symmetrically, 1 > 0:
Assume both players use b with positive probability, and assume that ties at b are broken with probability p 2 (0; 1) in favor of player 1. Let t 0 and t 00 , t 0 < t 00 ; be two values of t for which b 1 (t) = b: Then, 5 + t 0 ? 4E(t 2 jb 2 (t 2 ) = b) b; else 1 would be better to bid b ? " with t 0 : But then, 5 + t 00 ? 4E(t 2 jb 2 (t 2 ) = b) > b; and so 1 should deviate to b + " with t 00 : This is a contradiction. There are thus two possibilities.
(i) Assume rst that one player, w.l.o.g. player 2, does not use b with positive probability (since 2 > 0; this implies b 2 (0) < b; and also that player 1 bids b with positive probability since 1 > 0; and by de nition of b): Now, with t = 2 ? "; player 2 never wins, but by bidding b + " wins with positive probability for an expected value of 5+ 2 ?"?4( 1 =2): So, for 2 not to want to deviate, it must be that b 5 + 2 ? 4( 1 =2) > 5 + 2 ? 4 1 :
(ii) Assume next that both players use b with positive probability. Then, by the above, one player, again, w.l.o.g. player 2, always has ties at b decided against him. Let ( 1 ; 1 ) be the (non-empty) interval over which player 1 bids b: Then, with t = 2 ? "; player 2 wins only when t 1 < 1 ; while by bidding " more, he can also win when t 1 2 ( 1 ; 1 ) : For this not to be a pro table deviation, it must be that b 5 + 2 ? 4 ( 1 + 1 ) =2 > 5 + 2 ? 4 1 : Assume that 2 < 1: Pick t = 2 + "; and consider replacing b 2 (t) (which is by de nition greater than b) by any bid in (b; b 2 (t)): This bid pays less in the (positive probability, since 1 > 0) event that it still wins, and when it changes a win into a loss, t 1 1 ; and hence v 2 is at best 5+ 2 +"?4 1 < b: So, this is a pro table deviation, a contradiction. Thus, 2 = 1:
Since 2 = 1; it follows that 1 wins with probability 1 (since 2 does not win when t 2 < 1); and hence that he always bids b (he bids at least this by de nition, and need not bid any more since 2 = 1). Hence, b 3 = 5 + 0 ? 4(1=2); otherwise 1 is better to bid 0 with t 1 near 0. But then, player 2 can pro tably bid b+" when he has t above 0, a contradiction. Thus, there is no equilibrium to this game.
Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
We need some preliminary results. We begin by establishing some facts about weak* convergence and marginals. 
Because the marginal of n on X is and g is independent of Y , it follows that, for each n
for each n. Weak* convergence of ( n ) to guarantees that for n su ciently large Z g d n ?
Z g d < " Combining these inequalities, we conclude that j (Y U) ? (U)j < " Because " > 0 is arbitrary, it follows that (Y U) = (U). Because U is an arbitrary open set, it follows that the marginal of on X is , as asserted.
To see (ii), x a continuous real-valued function h on X Y and " > 0.
Write M = sup X Y jhj. Because f is integrable, there is a > 0 such that R E f d < " whenever (E) < ; without loss we may assume < ". Use
Lusin's theorem to choose a compact set K X such that (X n K) < and the restriction of f to K is continuous. Choose an open set U K such that (U n K) < "= max K f. Use Urysohn's lemma and the Tietze extension theorem to choose a continuous function f on X which agrees with f on K, vanishes o U, and for which max X f = max K f.
Recalling that the marginal of on X is , that R E f d < " whenever (E) < , that (X n K) < and that (U n K) < "= max X f, yields The proof makes use of the theory of vector measures and integration of vector-valued functions. An excellent reference is Diestel and Uhl (1977) ; we collect the basic information here. Let X be a set and F a sigma-algebra of subsets of X. (When X is a compact metric space we take F to be the sigma-algebra of Borel sets.) Let E be a Hausdor , locally convex topological vector space and let E be its dual, the space of continuous linear functionals. For ! 2 E; ' 2 E , we write ' ! for the value of ' at !. A vector measure on X with values in E (an E-valued measure) is a (weakly) countably-additive function : F ! E. 15 For an E-valued measure and ' 2 E , we write ' for the real-valued measure de ned by ' (E) = ' ( (E) E and : X ! is a correspondence, we write M(X; ) for the space of E-valued measures for which (E) 2 for each E 2 F, and AC(X; ) for the space of E-valued measures for which there exists a probability measure and a Pettis integrable selection z from such that = z . The rst part of the next lemma is a standard result for which there seems to be no convenient reference; the second part extends Lemma 2 of SZ to the in nite dimensional context. 15 Weak countable additivity means that if fE n g is a countable disjoint collection of Borel measurable subsets of X then ( S E n ) = P (E n ), convergence of the summation being in the weak topology of E ; equivalently, ' ( S E n ) = P ' (E n ) for each ' 2 E .
Lemma 2 If X is a compact metric space, E is a Hausdor locally convex topological vector space, E is a compact convex metrizable subset, and : X ! is an upper-hemi-continuous correspondence with non-empty compact convex values, then (i) M(X; ) is a compact metric space (in the weak* topology)
(ii) AC(X; ) is a closed subset of M(X; ) Proof To establish (i), we rst show that M(X; ) is compact. To this end, let ( ) M(X; ) be a net. For each ' 2 E , (' ) is a net of scalar measures, and hence has a convergent subnet. We may therefore extract a single subnet ( ) of ( ) with the property that for each ' 2 E there is a scalar measure ' such that ' ! ' weak*. For each Borel set E X, compactness and convexity of guarantees that we may implicitly de ne a unique element (E) = by requiring that ' (E) = ' (E) for every ' 2 E . The de nitions imply immediately that 2 M(X; ) and ! weak*. 
This is easily seen to be a metric and it is easily checked that the metric topology is weaker than the weak* topology. Since the weak* topology is compact, the metric topology coincides with the weak* topology. This completes the proof of (i).
To establish (ii), we must show rst that AC(X; ) is a subset of M(X; ).
To see this, let 2 AC(X; ) and write = z for some probability measure and some selection z of . By de nition, for each Borel set E X and each ' 2 E we have
' z d This is the integral of a scalar function with respect to a probability measure, so lies in the closed convex hull of 0 and the range of ' z, which is a subset of ' . 16 Since ' (E) 2 ' for each ' 2 E and is convex, the separation theorem guarantees that (E) 2 . Since E is arbitrary, it follows that 2 AC(X; ) as desired.
To complete the proof, let ( n ) AC(X; ) be a sequence converging weak* to 2 M(X; ); we must show 2 AC(X; ). For each n, choose a probability measure n and a selection z n from such that n = z n n .
Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that there is probability measure such that n ! weak*; we construct a selection z from such that = z .
It is convenient to imbed in IR 1 . To accomplish this, let f' j g be the countable family of linear functionals chosen above and de ne a linear mapping : E ! IR 1 by (x) = (' 1 (x); : : :; ). If IR 1 is endowed with the product topology, this mapping is continuous. Because the collection (' j ) distinguishes points of , the restriction of to is one-to-one; because is compact, the restriction of to is a homeomorphism. Because we can now replace ; ; E by ( );
; IR 1 , we may assume without loss that E = IR 1 . For each positive integer k, let k : IR 1 ! IR k be the projection on the rst k coordinates and let k : IR k ! IR k?1 be the projection on the rst k ? 1 coordinates. Fix an index k. The composition k n is a vector measure with values in IR k and the composition k z n is a selection from the correspondence k . Continuity of k implies that the sequence ( k n ) of IR k -valued measures converges weak* to k , so Lemma 2 of SZ guarantees that there is a selection z k from k such that k = z k .
Note that k k = k?1 . Uniqueness of the Radon-Nikodym derivative implies that k z k = z k?1 almost everywhere (with respect to ). We can therefore choose a set X 0 X such that (X n X 0 ) = 0 and k z k (x) = z k?1 (x) for every x 2 X 0 and every index k. For each index k and x 2 X 0 , write k (x) = ?1 k (z k (x)) \ (x). Compactness of (x) and continuity of k guarantee that k (x) is compact, and the construction of X 0 guarantee that ( k (x)) is a decreasing sequence of compact sets, so the intersection T k (x) is not empty. Our construction guarantees that this intersection consists of a single point, which we de ne to be z(x). By construction, z is a selection from on X 0 . The graph of z is the intersection of the graphs of the measurable correspondences ?1 k (z k ( )) \ ( ), so z is measurable. Extend z arbitrarily to a measurable selection on all of X.
Our construction guarantees that, for each k, z k = k z is the RadonNikodym derivative of k . Linearity of k guarantees that for every Borel subset G X we have
Since this is true for every k, we conclude that (G) = R G z d , as desired.
The next lemma is an extension of a result of Dellacherie and Meyer (1982) to the present context. 17 Lemma 3 Let X; Y be a compact metric spaces, let E be a locally convex topological vector space, let be a compact convex metrizable subset of E, and let : X ! be an upper-hemi-continuous correspondence with nonempty, compact, convex values. Let y 7 ! y be a weak* measurable family of E-valued measures on X having the property that for every y 2 Y there is a selection z y from such that y = z y . Then there is a Borel measurable function Z : X Y ! E such that for each y 2 Y , Z( ; y) is a selection from and y = Z( ; y) . (That is, Z( ; y) = z y almost everywhere with respect to .)
Proof As in the proof of Lemma 2, there is no loss in assuming that E = IR 1 ; we adopt the notation of that proof. For each k, f k y : y 2 Y g is a weak* measurable family of measures on X with values in IR k , and for every y 2 Y the composition k z y is a selection from k such that k y = ( k z y ) . Applying Theorem V.58 of Dellacherie and Meyer (1982) to each coordinate separately, we may nd a Borel function Z k : X Y ! IR k such that k y = Z k ( ; ; y) for each y 2 Y . As in the proof of Lemma 2, we can construct a Borel function Z : X Y ! IR 1 such that k Z = Z k for each k.
The construction guarantees that y = Z ( ; y) for every y 2 Y . However, Z need not be quite the function we want because it need not be a selection from ; a perturbation will achieve this. Uniqueness of the Radon-Nikodym derivative implies that for every y 2 Y , Z (x; y) = z y (x) for -almost all x 2 X, whence Z(x; y) = Z (x; y) = z y (x) for -almost all x 2 X. Thus Z is the desired mapping.
Finally, it is convenient to isolate a lemma that will be used several times. If ? is a game with action spaces A i and type spaces T i and f is any function or correspondence de ned on A, we writef for the trivial extension of f to A T:f(a; t) = f(a). Proof Fix i. We begin by constructing an approximation to u i by a continuously weighted sum of a ne functions. Write E for the dual space of E (the space of continuous linear functionals, equipped with the topology of pointwise convergence).
Fix " > 0. For a 2 A; t 2 T, the function u i (a; ; t) is a ne on (a), so it can be approximated to within " by an a ne function on E. 19 That is, there are a constant c at and a linear functional ' at 2 E such that ju i (a; !; t) ? c at ? ' at !j < " for each ! 2 (a). Compactness of A; T; , continuity of u i and ' at , and upper-hemi-continuity of imply that there are neighborhoods W(a; t) of (a; t) in A T and W 0 (a; t) of 0 in such that (a 0 ; t 0 ) 2 W(a; t); ! 0 2 (a 0 ) ) 9! 2 (a) such that (!?! 0 ) 2 W 0 (a; t) (a 0 ; t 0 ) 2 W(a; t); ! 0 2 (a 0 ); (! ? ! 0 ) 2 W 0 (a; t) ) ju i (!; a; t) ? u i (! 0 ; a 0 ; t 0 )j < " ; j' at (! ? ! 0 )j < "
Combining these facts, we conclude that (a 0 ; t 0 ) 2 W(a; t); ! 0 2 (a 0 ) ) ju i (! 0 ; a 0 ; t 0 ) ? c at ? ' at ! 0 j < 3"
The family fW(a; t)g is a cover of A T by open sets. Choose a nite subcover fW(a j ; t j )g and a partition of unity ff j g subordinate to this cover; i.e., a family of continuous functions f j : A T ! 0; 1] such that 18 We do not assume that r is the joint distribution of any strategy pro le. 19 See Phelps (1966) . In the in nite dimensional context, there may be no a ne function on E which coincides with u i (a; ; t) on (a). With the preliminaries complete, we turn to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1 As indicated, the proof is in six steps. The argument is a bit fussy because we need to keep track of strategies and selections in several games. Recall that, as a mnemonic device to distinguish between announcements and true types, we write S i = T i for each i. Without loss of generality, we assume that 0 u i 1 for each i.
Step 1: Finite Approximations For each r = 1; 2; : : : and each player i, choose and x nite subsets S r i S i ; A r i A i such that every point of S i is within 1=r of some point in S r i and every point of A i is within 1=r of some point in A r i . For each r, let q r : A ! be a Borel measurable selection from . For each r, let ? r be the Bayesian game with player set N, action spaces A r i , type spaces T i , prior probability distribution and utility functions u r i (a; t) = u i (a; q r (a); t) Milgrom and Weber (1985) show that ? r has an equilibrium r = ( r 1 ; : : : ; r n ) in distributional strategies.
Let ? cr be the Bayesian game with player set N, action spaces S r i A r i , type spaces T i , prior probability distribution and utility functions u r i (s; a; t) = u i (a; q r (a); t) Payo s in ? cr are independent of announcements, so announcements are cheap talk. for the set of announcement/action/type pro les for which announcements are truthful. By construction, r is supported on , so gives probability one to truthful announcements.
For each r, de ne r : S A ! and~ r : S A T ! by~ r (s; a; t) = r (s; a) = q r (a). De ne~ c : S A T ! by~ c (s; a; t) = c (s; a) = (a).
Note that r is a selection from c and that~ r is a selection from~ c .
Step 2: Limits Passing to an appropriate subsequence if necessary, we may assume that, for each i, the sequence ( r i ) of scalar measures converges weak* to a scalar measure i on S i A i T i , and the sequence (~ r r ) of E-valued measures converges weak* to an E-valued measure on S A T.
Note that convergence of individual strategies implies convergence of joint distributions; that is, r ! , the joint distribution of = ( 1 ; : : :; n ). By Lemma 2, there is a Borel measurable selection from such that = . De ne (s; a) = (s; a; s) for every (s; a) 2 S A. Note that is supported on , the set of truthful pro les, so~ = almost everywhere (with respect to ), whence =~ .
Step 3: Convergence of Utilities Applying Lemma 4 to the game ? c , we conclude that utilities converge. That is, for each i:
Step 4: Identifying Better Responses The selection is only determined up to sets of measure 0, so we may have chosen the wrong selections ;~ . This leaves open the possibility that players may have pro table deviations. We will construct perturbations of ;~ to eliminate these deviations. In order to do this, we rst identify the places where perturbation is required.
By assumption, is absolutely continuous with respect to the product of its marginals; let F : T ! IR be the the Radon-Nikodym derivative (which we can assume is a Borel function), so that = F ( i ). Notice that the conditionals are ( jt i ) = F( jt i )( i ).
Fix a player i. Consider (3), this is at most R i (L). Taken together, these last three facts constitute a contradiction (for r large enough). We conclude that i (H i ) = 0 as asserted.
Step 5: Perturbation We now correct the selection on H i . Intuitively speaking, the correction is to give player i the limit of what he would obtain in the games ? cr ; the details are complicated because we must put these limits together in a manner that is consistent across actions of others and measurable in i's own actions. Write The construction of Step 4 guarantees that (H) = 0. In particular, Eu i ( j ) = Eu i ( j 0 ) for all i.
Step 6: Equilibrium We assert that the selection 0 and strategy pro le constitute a solution for the game ? c . To see this, x a player i. We must
show that for almost all t i 2 T i , the strategy i is a best response to ?i , given that agent i is type t i . We only have to worry about types t i 2 T i , because the complementary set of types has measure 0. This contradicts (9), so we conclude that 0 ; is a solution, as desired.
Proof of Theorem 2 The argument follows by substituting the given solutions for the solutions constructed in
Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 1, and continuing as in Steps 2-6.
